Education

A.B. (Mathematics), Harvard University, 1972
A.M. (Applied Mathematics), Harvard University, 1974
Ph.D. (Applied Mathematics), Harvard University, 1976

Academic Positions

Research Fellow, Jesus College, Cambridge University, 1976-77
Assistant Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1977-80
Associate Professor of Economics, M.I.T., 1980-81
Overseas Fellow, Churchill College, Cambridge University, 1980-82
Professor of Economics, M.I.T., 1981-84
Professor of Economics, Harvard University, 1985-2000, 2012-
Visiting Overseas Fellow, St. John's College, Cambridge, 1987-88
Louis Berkman Professor of Economics, Harvard University, 1997-2000
Visiting Professor of Economics, M.I.T., 1999-2000
Visiting Lecturer in Economics, Princeton University, 2000-2012
Albert O. Hirschman Professor of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton,
2000-2011
SK Visiting Professor, Yonsei University, Seoul, 2009-10, 2015
Visiting Professor, I.A.S., Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 2010-
Director, Jerusalem Summer School in Economic Theory, 2008-
Adams University Professor, Harvard University 2012-

FELLOWSHIPS, GRANTS, AND AWARDS

National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship, 1972-75
National Science Foundation Research Grants, 1977- 2013
U.K. Economic and Social Science Research Council Grants, 1978-1995
J.S. Guggenheim Fellowship, 1980-81
Fellow, Econometric Society, elected 1981
Sloan Research Fellowship, 1983-85
Galbraith Teaching Prize, Economics Department, Harvard University, 1990, 1992
Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, elected 1994
Monash Distinguished Visiting Scholar, Monash University, 2003
Corresponding Fellow, British Academy, elected 2003
Fellow, European Economic Association, elected 2004
Honorary Fellow, St. John’s College, Cambridge, elected 2004
Kempe Award in Environmental Economics (with P. Dasgupta), 2007
Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics (with L. Hurwicz and R. Myerson), 2007
EFR – Business Week Award, University of Rotterdam, 2008
Member, National Academy of Sciences, elected 2008
Distinguished Fellow, House of Finance, University of Frankfurt, 2008
Grande Médaille of the City of Marseille, 2009
Honorary Fellow, Jesus College, Cambridge, elected 2009
Fellow, Royal Academy of Economic Sciences and Finance (Spain), elected 2009
Centennial Medal, Harvard University, Graduate School of Arts and Science, 2010
Economic Theory Fellow, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, elected
2011
Cristóbal Gabarrón Foundation International Economics Award, 2011
Médaille d’Or, City of Toulouse, 2013
Memorial Medal, Comenius University, Bratislava, 2013
Jean-Jacques Laffont Prize, Toulouse School of Economics, 2013
Louise Blouin Foundation Award, 2013
Medal of Honor, Congress of Peru, 2014
Charter Fellow, Society for Economic Measurement, elected 2014
Gold Medal of Honorary Patronage, University Philosophical Society, Trinity College
Dublin, 2014
James Joyce Award, Literary and Historical Society, Trinity College, Dublin, 2014

HONORARY DEGREES

M.A. (Honorary), Cambridge University, 1977
Doctor of Humane Letters, Bard College, 2008
Doctor Honoris Causa, Corvinus University of Budapest, 2008
Honorary Doctor, University of Cambodia, 2010
Doctor Honoris Causa, Université Libre de Bruxelles, 2010
Doctor Honoris Causa, Universidad del Norte, Paraguay, 2011
Doctor Honoris Causa, Azerbaijan State University of Economics, 2011
Doctor Honoris Causa, Technical University of Lisbon, 2012
Doctor Honoris Causa, Tumkur University, India, 2013
D.H.L., Georgetown University, 2013 (graduate commencement speaker)

Doctor Honoris Causa, National University of San Marcos, Peru, 2014
Doctor Honoris Causa, Kazakh Humanities and Law University, 2015

HONORARY PROFESSORSHIPS

Wuhan University, 2004
Central University of Finance and Economics, 2006
Tsinghua University, 2007
National Research University-Higher School of Economics, Moscow, 2008
Shenzhen University, 2008
Eurasian National University, 2012
Saint Petersburg University of Management and Economics, 2012
Tumkur University, 2013
Zhejiang University, 2016

NAMED LECTURES

• Wellington-Burnham Lecture, Tufts University, December 1993


• Churchill Lectures, Cambridge University, April 1994


• Brussels Lecture in Managerial Economics, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, May 1994


• Miller Lecture, Iowa State University, December 1996


• Kenneth Arrow Lectures, Stanford University, April 1998


• Alfred Marshall Lecture, European Economic Association, Santiago de Compostela, Spain, September 1999


• Vilfredo Pareto Lecture, ASSET conference, Tel Aviv, October 1999


• Seattle Lecture, World Congress of the Econometric Society, Seattle, August 2000


• Lionel McKenzie Lecture, University of Rochester, April 2001


• Nancy Schwartz Memorial Lecture, Northwestern University, May 2002


• Presidential Lecture, Econometric Society, Stockholm, Panama City, Evanston, and
  Sydney, 2003


• T.S. Kim Memorial Lecture, Seoul National University, May 2004


• Toulouse Lectures, University of Toulouse, June 2004


• Zeuthen Lectures, University of Copenhagen, November 2004


• Arrow Lecture, Society for Social Choice and Welfare, Istanbul, July 2006


• Jacob Marschak Lecture, South East Asian Meetings, Econometric Society, Chennai, India, December, 2006


• Marshall Lectures, Cambridge University, March 2007


• Pazner Memorial Lecture, University of Tel Aviv, May 2007


• Lawrence Klein Lecture, University of Pennsylvania, May 2007


• Kempe Award Lecture, Umea, Sweden, October 2007


• Nobel Memorial Prize Lecture, Stockholm, December, 2007


• G. Woody Thompson Lecture, Midwest Economics Association, March 2008


• Sun Hung Kai Nobel Laureate Distinguished Lecture, Chinese University of Hong Kong,
  April 2008


• Max Weber Lecture, European University Institute, Florence, September 24, 2008


• John F. Nash Lecture, Carroll Round, Georgetown University, April, 2009


• Pareto Lecture, Collegio Carlo Alberto, Turin, June 2009


• Bogen Lecture, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, June 2009


• McKenzie Lecture, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, Ischia, July 2009


• Hurwicz Lecture, Minnesota Economics Association, Minneapolis, October 2009


• Arrow Lecture, Columbia University, December 2009


• Zvi Griliches Memorial Lectures, New Economic School, Moscow, May 2010


• Leonid Hurwicz Memorial Lecture, Warsaw School of Economics, October 2010


• Robert Rosenthal Memorial Lecture, Boston University, April 2011


• Inaugural Chen Daisun Memorial Lecture, Tsinghua University, April 2011


• David Pearce Lecture, EAERE conference, Rome, June 2011


• Inaugural Federico II Nobel Laureate Lecture, University of Naples, May 2012


• Academia Sinica Lecture, Taipei, June 2012


• Presidential Lecture, Game Theory Society, Istanbul, July 2012


• Graduate Commencement Address, Georgetown University, May 2013


• Amartya Sen Lecture, Human Development and Capability Association meeting, Jakarta,
  September 2012


• Albert Hirschman Lecture, Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association, Lima,
  November 2012


• Jean-Jacques Laffont Prize Lecture, Toulouse, June 2013


• Chen Daisun Memorial Lecture, Tsinghua University, Beijing, December 2013


• Sir Arthur Lewis Memorial Lecture, Castries, Saint Lucia, January 2014


• Nobel Prize Inspiration Initiative Lecture, FGV, Rio de Janiero, March, 2014


• Leonid Hurwicz Lecture, Econometric Society, Minneapolis, June 2014


• JIN Lecture, James Madison University, October 2014


• Convocation Address, Indian Statistical Institute, Calcutta, January 2015


• David Ruthenberg Memorial Lecture, Hebrew University, June 2015


• Leo Hurwicz Plenary Lecture, Society for Economic Design, Istanbul, July 2015


• Hahn Memorial Lecture, University of Siena, October 2015


• Gorman Lectures, University College London, February 2016


• Economics Frontier Lecture, Nankai University, April 2016


• Distinguished Academic Lecture, Zhejiang University, April 2016

JOURNAL ARTICLES AND BOOK CHAPTERS

1. “A Theorem on Utilitarianism,” Review of Economic Studies, Vol. XLVI (4), 1978, pp. 93-96.
2. “Fonctions de Préférence Collective Définies sur des Domaines de Préférence Individuelle Soumis à des Constraintes,” Cahiers du Seminaire d'Econométrie, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1979, pp. 153-182.
3. “A Differential Approach to Expected Utility Maximizing Mechanisms” (with J.J. Laffont), in J.J. Laffont (ed.), Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences, North Holland, 1979, pp. 289-308.
4. “Implementation and Strong Nash Equilibrium,” in J.J. Laffont (ed.), Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences, North Holland, 1979, pp. 433-440.
5. “Decision-Making under Ignorance with Implications for Social Choice,” Theory and Decision, 11, 1979, pp. 319-337.
6. “The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility” (with P. Dasgupta and P. Hammond), Review of Economic Studies, Vol. XLVI (2), 1979, pp. 185-216. Reprinted in P. Dasgupta, Selected Papers of Partha Dasgupta, Vol. I, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 191-234.
7. “An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contracts, I: Steady States” (with P. Diamond), Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 1979, pp. 282-316.
8. “On the Difficulty of Attaining Distributional Goals with Imperfect Information” (with J. J. Laffont), Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1979, pp. 27-37.
9. “Voting for Public Alternatives: Some Notes on Majority Rule,” National Tax Journal, Vol. XXXII, 1979, pp. 105-110.
10. “Condorcet Proportions and Kelly's Conjectures” (with P. Fishburn and W. Gehrlein), Discrete Applied Mathematics, 1, 1979, pp. 229-252.
11. “Progress Report on Kelly's Majority Conjectures” (with P. Fishburn and W. Gehrlein), Economics Letters, 2, 1979, pp. 313-314.
12. “On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control” (with P. Dasgupta and P. Hammond), Review of Economic Studies, 1980, pp. 857-860. Reprinted in P. Dasgupta, Selected Papers of Partha Dasgupta, Vol. I, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 235-240.
13. “A Differentiable Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms” (with J.J. Laffont), Econometrica, 48, 1980, pp. 1507-1520.
14. “On First-best Taxation,” in J.R.C. Lecomber and M. Slater (eds.), Income Distribution: The Limits to Redistribution, Scientechnica, 1980, pp. 9-22.
15. “Optimal Reservation Price in the Vickrey Auction” (with J.J. Laffont), Economics Letters, 6, 1980, pp. 309-313.
16. “An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract, II: A Non-Steady Example” (with P. Diamond), Journal of Economic Theory, 1981, pp. 165-195.
17. “Nash and Dominant Strategy Implementation in Economic Environments” (with J.J. Laffont), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1982, pp. 17-47.
18. “A Characterization of Strongly Locally Incentive-Compatible Planning Procedures with Public Goods” (with J.J. Laffont), Review of Economic Studies, 1983, 50, pp. 171-196.
19. “The Theory of Incentives: An Overview” (with J.J. Laffont), in W. Hildenbrand (ed.), Advances in Economic Theory (invited lectures from the 4th World Congress of the Econometric Society), Cambridge University Press, 1982, pp. 31-94.
20. “The Gains to Making Losers Pay in High Bid Auctions” (with J. Riley), in R. Englebrecht-Wiggans, M. Shubik, and R. Stark (eds.), Auctions, Bidding, and Contracting, New York University Press, 1983, pp. 205-230.
21. “Monopolistic Quantity Rationing” (with V. Bohm, H. Polemarchakis, and A. Postlewaite), Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1983, 98, pp. 189-198.
22. “Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks” (with O.Hart and S. Grossman),
Journal of Political Economy, 1983, pp. 907-926. Reprinted in S. Grossman, The Informational Role of Prices, MIT Press, 1989, pp. 190-212.
23. “A Second-Best Approach to Incentive Compatibility” (with J.J. Laffont), in M. Boyer and R. Kihlstrom (eds.), Bayesian Models in Economic Theory, Elsevier Science Publishers, 1984, pp. 143-154.
24. “On the Efficiency of Fixed Price Equilibria” (with J. Tirole), Journal of Economic Theory, 32, 1984, pp. 317-327.
25. “Optimal Auctions with Risk-Averse Buyers” (with J. Riley), Econometrica, Vol. 52, No. 6, November 1984, pp. 1473-1518. Reprinted in P. Klemperer (ed.), The Economic Theory of Auctions, London: Edward Elgar, 2000.
26. “Monopoly with Incomplete Information” (with J. Riley), Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 15, No. 2, Summer 1984, pp. 171-196. Reprinted in G. Norman (ed.), The Economics of Price Discrimination, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1999; Also reprinted in M. Waldman and J. R. Johnson (eds.), Pricing Tactics, Strategies, and Outcomes, vol. I, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2007.
27. “Auction Theory with Private Values” (with J. Riley), American Economic Review, 75(2), 1985, pp. 150-156, reprinted in P. Klemperer (ed.), The Economic Theory of Auctions, London: Edward Elgar, 2000.
28. “Input Versus Output Incentive Schemes” (with J. Riley), Journal of Public Economics, 28(l), 1985, pp. 1-23.
29. “The Theory of Implementation in Nash Equilibrium: A Survey,” in L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler, and H. Sonnenschein (eds.), Social Goals And Social Organization: Volume in Memory of Elisha Pazner, Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 173-204. Reprinted in A. Rubinstein (ed.), Game Theory in Economics, London: Edward Elgar, 1995.
30. “The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, Part I (Theory)” (with P. Dasgupta), Review of Economic Studies, 53(l), 1986, pp. 1-26. Reprinted in K. Binmore and P. Dasgupta (eds.), Economic Organizations as Games, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, pp. 48-82.
31. “The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, Part II (Applications)” (with P. Dasgupta), Review of Economic Studies, 53(1), 1986, pp. 27-41. Reprinted in K. Binmore and P. Dasgupta (eds.), Economic Organizations as Games, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, pp. 83-102.
32. “An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria” (with R. Radner and R. Myerson), Review of Economic Studies,
53(l), 1986, pp. 59-69.
33. “The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information” (with D. Fudenberg), Econometrica, 54(3), 1986, pp. 533-554. Reprinted in A. Rubinstein (ed.), Game Theory in Economics, London: Edward Elgar, 1995. Also reprinted in D. Fudenberg and D. Levine (eds.), A Long-Run Collaboration on Games with Long-Run Patient Players, World Scientific Publishers, 2009, pp. 209-230.
34. “The Existence of Equilibrium with Price-Setting Firms,” American Economic Review, 76(2), 1986, pp. 382-386.
35. “Optimal Bayesian Mechanisms,” in W. Heller, R. Starr, and D. Starrett (eds.), Uncertainty, Information and Communication, Volume 3 (essays in honor of Kenneth Arrow), Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp. 229-238.
36. “On the Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods,” in G. Feiwel (ed.), Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy (essays in honor of Kenneth Arrow), MacMillan, 1987, pp. 341-349.
37. “Monopoly with Asymmetric Information about Quality: Behavior and Regulation” (with J.J. Laffont), European Economic Review, 31(1), 1987, pp. 483-489.
38. “A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, III: Cournot Competition” (with J. Tirole), European Economic Review, 31(4), 1987, pp. 947-968. “Corrigendum,” European Economic Review, 32(7), 1988, pp. 1567-1568.
39. “Optimal Nonlinear Pricing with Two-Dimensional Characteristics” (with J.J. Laffont and J.C. Rochet) in T. Groves, R. Radner, and S. Reiter (eds.), Information, Incentives and Economic Mechanisms (essays in honor of Leonid Hurwicz), University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1987, pp. 256-266.
40. “Correlated Equilibria and Sunspots” (with J. Tirole), Journal of Economic Theory, 43(2), 1987, pp. 364-373.
41. “The Simple Economics of Research Portfolios” (with P. Dasgupta), Economic Journal, 97, 1987, pp. 581-595. Reprinted in P. Dasgupta, Selected Papers of Partha Dasgupta, Vol. I, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 329-346.
42. “A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs” (with J. Tirole), Econometrica, 56(3), 1988, pp. 549-570.
43. “A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles” (with J. Tirole), Econometrica, 56(3), 1988, pp. 571-599. Reprinted in J. Gabszewicz and J.-F. Thisse (eds.), Microeconomic Theories of Imperfect
Competition: Old Problems and New Perspectives, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999.
44. “Optimal Multi-Unit Auctions” (with J. Riley), in F. Hahn (ed.), The Economics of Missing Markets, Information, and Games, Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 312-335. Reprinted in P. Klemperer, The Economic Theory of Auctions, London: Edward Elgar, 2000.
45. “Renegotiation in Repeated Games” (with J. Farrell), Games and Economic Behavior, 1, 1989, pp. 327-360. Reprinted in E. Maskin (ed.), Recent Developments in Game Theory, London: Edward Elgar, 1999, pp. 388-421.
46. “Renegotiation-Proof Equilibrium: Reply” (with J. Farrell), Journal of Economic Theory, 49(2), 1989, pp. 376-378.
47. “Efficient Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria in Repeated Games” (with R. Evans), Games and Economic Behavior, 1, 1989, pp. 361-369.
48. “Rational Expectations with Imperfect Competition: A Bertrand-Edgeworth Example” (with J.J. Laffont), Economics Letters, 30, 1989, pp. 269-274.
49. “Disadvantageous Oil Tariffs and Dynamic Consistency” (with D. Newbery), American Economic Review, 80(l), 1990, pp. 143-156.
50. “The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Insider Trading on the Stock Market” (with J.J. Laffont), Journal of Political Economy, 98(l), 1990, pp. 70-93.
51. “The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values” (with J. Tirole), Econometrica, 58(2), 1990, pp. 379-409. Reprinted in J.J. Laffont (ed.), The Principal-Agent Model: The Economic Theory of Incentives, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003.
52. “Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games” (with D. Fudenberg), Journal of Economic Theory, 51, 1990, pp. 194-206.
53. “Contract Renegotiation in Models of Asymmetric Information” (with M. Dewatripont), European Economic Review, 34(2&3), 1990, pp. 311-321.
54. “Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games” (with D. Fudenberg), American Economic Review, 80(2), 1990, pp. 274-279. Reprinted in E. Maskin (ed.), Recent Developments in Game Theory, London: Edward Elgar, 1999, pp. 339-344.
55. “Repeated Games with Long and Short-Run Players” (with D. Fudenberg and D. Kreps), Review of Economic Studies, 57, 1990, pp. 555-573.
56. “On the Dispensability of Public Randomization in Discounted Repeated Games” (with D. Fudenberg), Journal of Economic Theory, 53, 1991, pp. 428-438.
57. “The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values” (with J. Tirole), Econometrica, 60(l), 1992, pp. 1-42.
58. “Production Fluctuations and Fiscal Policy in an Economy with Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Shocks” (with O. Hart) in P. Dasgupta, D. Gale, O. Hart and E. Maskin (eds.), Economic Analysis of Markets and Games (essays in honor of Frank Hahn), MIT Press, 1992, pp. 107-127.
59. “Auctions and Privatization,” in Horst Siebert (ed.) Privatization, J.C.B. Mohr Publisher, 1992, pp. 115-136.
60. “Centralization of Credit and Long-Term Investment” (with M. Dewatripont) in P. Bardhan and J. Roemer (eds.) Market Socialism: The Current Debate, Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 169-174.
61. “The Invisible Hand and Externalities,” American Economic Review, 1994, Vol. 84, No. 2, pp. 333-337. Reprinted in R. Tresch (ed.), Public Sector Economics: Critical Concepts, London: Routledge,
62. “Conceptual Economic Theory,” in P. Klein (ed.), The Role of Economic Theory, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994, pp. 187-195.
63. “The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information” (with D. Fudenberg and D. Levine), Econometrica, 62(5), 1994, pp. 997-1039. Reprinted in E. Maskin (ed.), Recent Developments in Game Theory, London: Edward Elgar, 1999, pp. 345-387. Also reprinted in D. Fudenberg and D. Levine (eds.), A Long-Run Collaboration on Games with Long-Run Patient Players, World Scientific Publishers, 2009, pp. 231-274.
64. “Majority Rule, Social Welfare Functions, and Games Forms,” in K. Basu, P. Pattanaik, and K. Suzumura (eds.), Choice, Welfare, and Development (essays in honor of Amartya Sen), Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 100-109.
65. “Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules when the Designer does not Know Endowments or Production Sets” (with L. Hurwicz and A. Postlewaite), in J. Ledyard (ed.), The Economics of Informational Decentralization: Complexity, Efficiency and Stability (essays in honor of Stanley Reiter), Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995, pp. 367-433.
66. “Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies” (with M. Dewatripont), Review of Economic Studies, 62, 1995, pp. 541-555. Reprinted in S. Bhattacharya, A. Boot and A. Thakor (eds.), Credit, Intermediation and the
Macroeconomy Models and Perspectives, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 591-610.
67. “Long-Term Investment by Japanese and American Firms,” Japan and the World Economy, 7, 1995, pp. 249-254.
68. “Contractual Contingencies and Renegotiation” (with M. Dewatripont), Rand Journal of Economics, 1995, pp. 704-719.
69. “A Walrasian Theory of Money and Barter” (with A. Banerjee), Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. CXI, (4), 1996, pp. 955-1605. Abridged version reprinted in Spanish as “Una Teoría Walrasiana de Dinero y Trueque,” Gaceto de Economia, 3(5), 1997, pp. 5-15.
70. “Theories of the Soft Budget Constraint,” Japan and the World Economy, 1996, pp. 125-133.
71. “Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality,” Review of Economic Studies, 66, 1999, pp. 23-38. Reprinted in J.J. Laffont (ed.), The Principal Agent Model: The Economic Theory of Incentives, London: Edward Elgar, 2003.
72. “Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts” (with J. Tirole), Review of Economic Studies, 66, 1999, pp. 83-114.
73. “Two Remarks on the Property-Rights Literature” (with J. Tirole), Review of Economic Studies, 66, 1999, pp. 139-149.
74. “Implementation and Renegotiation” (with J. Moore), Review of Economic Studies, 66, 1999, pp. 39-56.
75. “Recent Theoretical Work on the Soft Budget Constraint,” American Economic Review, 89, No. 2, 1999, pp. 421-425.
76. “Democracy and the Good” (with P. Dasgupta), in I. Shapiro and C. Hacker-Cordon (eds.), Rethinking Democracy for a New Century, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
77. “Uncertainty and Entry Deterrence,” Economic Theory, 14, 1999, pp. 429-437.
78. “Bargaining, Production, and Monotonicity in Economic Environments” (with M. Chen), Journal of Economic Theory, 89(1), November 1999, pp. 140-147.
79. “Introduction,” in E. Maskin (ed.), Recent Developments in Game Theory, London: Edward Elgar, 1999, pp. ix-xviii.
80. “Managing Ecosystem Resources” (with K. Arrow, G. Dailey, P. Dasgupta, S. Levin, K.-
G. Maler, D. Starrett, T. Sterner, and T. Tietenberg), Environmental Science and Technology, 34, 2000, pp. 1401-1406.
81. “Efficient Auctions” (with P. Dasgupta), Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. CXV, May 2000, pp. 341-388.
82. “Auctions, Development, and Privatization: Efficient Auctions with Liquidity-Constrained Buyers” (text of the Marshall lecture to the European Economic Association), European Economic Review, Vol. 44 (4-6), May 2000, pp. 667-681.
83. “Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions” (with J. Riley), Review of Economic Studies, 67, 2000, pp. 439-454.
84. “Asymmetric Auctions” (with J. Riley), Review of Economic Studies, 67, 2000, pp. 413-438. Reprinted in P. Klemperer (ed.), The Economic Theory of Auctions, London: Edward Elgar, 2000.
85. “Soft Budget Constraints and Transition” (with M. Dewatripont and G. Roland), in E. Maskin and A. Simonovits (eds.), Planning, Shortage and Transformation (essays in honor of Janos Kornai), Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000, pp. 143-156.
86. “Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form” (with Y. Qian and C. Xu), Review of Economic Studies, 67, 2000, pp. 359-378.
87. “Soft Budget Constraint Theories: From Centralization to the Market” (with C. Xu), Economics of Transition, 9, 2001, pp. 1-27. Reprinted in E. Berglof and G. Roland (eds.), The Economics of Transition: Proceedings of the 5th Nobel Symposium, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pp. 12-36.
88. “Markov Perfect Equilibrium, I: Observable Actions” (with J. Tirole), Journal of Economic Theory, 100, 2001, pp. 191-219.
89. “Kinds of Theory,” in T. Negishi, R. Ramachandran and K. Mino (eds.), Economic Theory, Dynamics and Markets (essays in honor of Ryuzo Sato), Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001, pp. 45-55. Reprinted (in Japanese) in T. Negishi and K. Mino (eds.), Markets, Dynamics, and Economic Systems, 2011.
90. “Roy Radner and Incentive Theory,” Review of Economic Design, 6, 2001, pp. 311-324. Reprinted in T. Ichiishi and T. Marschak (eds.), Markets, Games, and Organizations (essays in honor of Roy Radner), Berlin: Springer, 2002, pp. 179-192.
91. “On Indescribable Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts,” European Economic Review, 46(4-5), 2002 pp. 725-733.
92. “Implementation Theory” (with T. Sjöström), in K. Arrow, A. Sen, and K. Suzumura (eds.), Handbook of Social Choice Theory Vol. I, Amsterdam: North Holland, 2002, pp. 237-288.
93. “Auctions and Efficiency” (text of the Seattle lecture), in M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen, and S. Turnovsky (eds.), Advances in Economic Theory (invited lectures from the 8th World Congress of the Econometric Society), Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 1-24.
94. “Mechanism Design for the Environment” (with S. Baliga), in K.G. Mäler, and J. Vincent (eds.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, Elsevier Science/North Holland, Vol 1, June 2003, pp. 306-324.
95. “Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Sealed High-Bid Auctions” (with J. Riley), Games and Economic Behavior (issue in memory of Robert Rosenthal), 45, 2003, pp. 395-409.
96. “Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint” (with J. Kornai and G. Roland), Journal of Economic Literature, 41(4), 2003, pp. 1095-1136. Reprinted in Hungarian, Közgazdasági Szemle, 60, 2004, (7-8) pp. 608-624 and (9) pp. 777-809. Reprinted in Russian, Voprosy Economiki, 11, 2004, pp. 4-33. Reprinted in Chinese, Comparative Studies, 2009, pp 79-94. Reprinted in Hungarian in J. Kornai, The Soft Budget Constraint, Budapest: Kalligram, 2014, pp 289-340.
97. “The Fairest Vote of All” (with P. Dasgupta), Scientific American, 290 (3), 2004, pp. 64-69.
98. “Jean-Jacques Laffont: A Look Back,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 2 (5), 2004, pp. 913-923.
99. “The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government” (with J. Tirole), American Economic Review, 94 (4), 2004, pp. 1034-1054. Reprinted in T. Dewan, K. Dowding, and K. Shepsle (eds.), Rational Choice Politics, London: Sage Publications, 2009, pp. 210-241.
100. “The Unity of Auction Theory,” Journal of Economic Literature, 42 (4), 2004, pp. 1102-1115.
101. “Why Has Inequality Increased in China?” Division of Labor and Transaction Costs, 1 (1), 2005, pp. 67-71.
102. “Public Goods and Public Science,” in K. Maskus and J. Reichman (eds.), International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology Under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 139-141.
103. “Uncertainty and Hyperbolic Discounting” (with P. Dasgupta), American Economic
Review, 95 (4), 2005, pp. 1290-1299 (winner of the 2007 Kempe Award in Environmental Economics). Reprinted in P. Dasgupta, Selected Papers of Partha Dasgupta, Vol. I, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 415-428.
104. “On the Rationale for Penalty Default Rules,” Florida State University Law Review, 33 (3), 2006, pp. 557-562.
105. “Bargaining and Destructive Power” (with P. Dasgupta), Annals of Economics and Finance, 8 (2), 2007, pp. 217-227.
106. “On the Fundamental Theorems of General Equilibrium” (with K. Roberts), Economic Theory, 35 (2), 2008, pp. 233-240.
107. “Public-Private Partnerships and Government Spending Limits” (with J. Tirole), International Journal of Industrial Organization, 26 (2), 2008, pp. 412-420.
108. “Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals,” in Les Prix Nobel 2007, Nobel Foundation, 2008 (Nobel Lecture). Reprinted in American Economic Review, 98 (3), 2008, pp. 567-76. Reprinted in Russian, Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Conference on Economics, Moscow, 2009. Reprinted in Spanish, RAE Revista Asturiana de Economia, 44, 2009, pp. 21-36.
109. “On the Robustness of Majority Rule” (with P. Dasgupta), Journal of the European Economic Association, 6 (5), 2008, pp. 949-973. Reprinted in P. Dasgupta, Selected Papers of Partha Dasgupta, Vol. I, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 391-414. Also reprinted in E. Maskin and A. Sen, The Arrow Impossibility Theorem, Columbia University Press, 2014, pp. 101-142
110. “Can Neural Data Improve Economics?” Science, 321, 2008, pp. 1788-1789.
111. “The Value of Victory: Social Origins of the Winner’s Curse in Common Value Auctions” (with W. van den Bos, J. Li, T. Lau. J. Cohen, R. Montague, and S. McClure), Judgment and Decision Making, 3 (7), 2008, pp. 483-492.
112. “Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation” (with J. Bessen), Rand Journal of Economics, 40 (4), 2009, pp. 611-635.
113. “Evolution, Cooperation, and Repeated Games,” in S. Levin (ed.), Games, Groups, and the Global Good, Springer, 2009, pp. 79-84.
114. “Nash Equilibrium and Mechanism Design,” Games and Economic Behavior, 71, 2011, pp. 9-11.
115. “Foreword” to Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, third edition, Yale
University Press, 2012, pp. v-ix.
116. “Foreword to the Special Section on Game Theory,” Current Science, 2012 109 (9), p. 970.
117. “How Should We Elect Our Leaders?” in J. Murray and R. Solow (eds.), Economics for the Curious: Inside the Minds of 12 Nobel Laureates, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, pp. 159-169. Reprinted in Portuguese, Os Desafios Da Economia, Clube Do Autor, 2014, pp.159-169.
118. “Preface, Introduction and Overview” (with S. Barrett and K.-G. Mäler), in Environment and Development Economics, Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. v-vii.
119. “The Arrow Impossibility Theorem: Where Do We go from Here?” in E. Maskin and A. Sen, The Arrow Impossibility Theorem, Columbia University Press, 2014, pp. 43-55.
120. “Comments on A. Honlonkou and R. Hassan’s ‘An Optimal Contract for Monitoring Illegal Exploitation of Co-managed Forests in Benin’ in S. Barrett, K.-G. Mäler, and E. Maskin (eds.), Environment and Development Economics, Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 268-69.
121. “Culture, Cooperation, and Repeated Games,” in L. Harrison and Y. Yasin (eds.), Culture Matters in Russia—and Everywhere, (volume in Memory of Samuel P. Huntington), Lexington Books, 2015. pp. 239-244.
122. “Comments on the Foundations of Incomplete Contracts,” in P. Aghion, M. Dewatripoint, P. Legros, and L. Zingales (eds.), The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics, Oxford University Press, 2015. pp. 345-348.
124. “Why Haven’t Global Markets Reduced Inequality in Emerging Economies” World Bank Economic Review, Oxford Journals, Vol. 29, 2015. pp. S48–S52.
125. “Friedrich von Hayek and Mechanism Design,” Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, 28 (3) 2015, pp. 247-252.
126. “Debreu’s Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem” (with P. Dasgupta), Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 112 (52), 2015, pp. 15769-15770.
127. “My Evolution as an Economist,” in R. Spencer and D. Macpherson (eds.), Lives of the Laureates, MIT Press, 2015, pp 349-363